The list of findings in the TAIC report is alarming.
Highlights are that the skipper maintains he was in 50m of water, but that TAIC think he was in 10m of water, and that the shallow water is a key factors in the rogue wave. This is the basis of the MNZ prosecution.
The superstructure and design of the boat was up to spec. It was the rogue wave that stuffed it.
It says there were no equipment or maintenance issues that contributed to the capsize, and the boat was well within its operating limits for the conditions.
BUT
The automatic EPIRB activation did not work
The automatic liferaft releases & activation did not work. For some reason the report does not investigate these, but focuses solely on where the lifejackets were stored. Stand by for some twaddlebollocks rules on where to stow life jackets.
Of 4 life rings, two did not have reflective tape and the other two the tape was so worn it didn't work. None had lights (this bit is surprising, for Cat 3 we need a lifering with a light).
Rescue Coordination Centre took 1 hr to task a rescue helicopter after getting the EPIRB signal. That was about 30 min after the capsize, as the beacon didn't go off and the skipper had to find it and manually activate it.
The rescue helicopter took a further 1hr 25 mins before deploying cause they had to convert from air ambulance to SAR, including installing winches................
Of three helo's deployed, delays were encountered getting together suitably qualified crew together for all of them.
After rescuing five people initially, the first helo ran out of fuel. The bowser at Kaitaia aerodrome was empty. At this stage they confirmed that 3 people were alive in the water when the left the scene.
It took 4hrs 36 minutes to get fuel. This was a direct delay of 4 hrs 36 min in searching for the last 5 guys, 3 of which were seen alive on the last trip.
Basically the entire rescue helicopter set up across the country is for air ambulance. Nothing has been set up or planned for for SAR operations. Crew aren't trained. Gear is not available, specifically helo's with winches. There is no fuel outside of the main centers to support extended search operations. I'm not sure what MNZ have been doing, but sipping latte's and eating donuts sounds highly likely.
Findings
Ngā kitenga
4.1 There were no known mechanical or equipment failures that contributed to the
accident.
4.2 It is about as likely as not that the accident occurred around the 10 metre depth
contour off Murimotu Island, North Cape.
4.3 It was not the skipper’s intention to navigate close to the shore in shallower water. The
reason for the Enchanter being there was not established.
4.4 It was reasonable for a vessel of the Enchanter’s size, design, stability and construction
to be operating in the weather and sea conditions around North Cape at the time of
the accident, provided it was operated in accordance with its Maritime Transport Safety
System and Marine Transport Operator Plan.
4.5 The Enchanter was knocked down by a wave that was larger and with a steeper profile
than the average wave conditions it had been encountering, because of one or a
combination of the following factors:
• waves up to twice that of the significant wave height can naturally occur in deep
water
• the convergence of two different wave patterns can cause random large waves
• reflection of waves off the shoreline
• the tendency for waves to increase in height and steepen when they enter
shallower water.
4.6 The Enchanter exceeded all stability parameters required under Maritime Rule Part 40,
and all its maritime documents were current at the time of the accident.
4.7 The Enchanter was unable to recover from the knock down because it was very likely
tipped past its point of vanishing stability and its superstructure failed allowing downflooding of its internal spaces.
4.8 It is virtually certain that the connection between the Enchanter’s superstructure and
hull was in good condition – the connection failing in overload when hydrodynamic
forces sustained during the knock down exceeded its design parameters.
4.9 Nine of the ten people onboard are known to have survived the initial capsize, but four
of them later died. It is virtually certain that one or a combination of the following
factors had an effect on survivability:
• time immersed in the water with associated hypothermia and swim failure
• limited flotation support (except for one person who was retrieved from a
lifebuoy)
• injuries sustained during the capsize
• pre-existing medical conditions.
Final Report MO-2022-201 | Page 50
4.10 None of the people on board were able to put on a life jacket because of the
suddenness of the capsize and because all life jackets were stowed below in the
forward cabin, which was difficult to access.
4.11 Opportunities to increase survivability were missed for the following reasons:
• the life rafts likely did not automatically deploy
• only two of the four lifebuoys were fitted with automatic lights
• two of the lifebuoys were not marked with retro-reflective tape and the
reflective tape on the other two was degraded and of limited effectiveness.
4.12 The crew of the first helicopter on scene managed the high-risk task of wet winching in
the dark over water with skill. Their expertise was instrumental in saving the lives of five
people from the Enchanter.
4.13 There were delays in the deployment of rescue helicopters to the Enchanter scene
while appropriately qualified and experienced crew were assembled.
4.14 Although helicopters were made available for the Enchanter SAR operation, the current
New Zealand SAR system does not ensure that readily available, appropriately
equipped and crewed, air resources will be available for future SAR operations,
particularly in remote areas.
4.15 There was a period of 4 hours and 36 minutes when the lack of available fuel
prevented helicopters searching for the remaining five people in the water, which was
attributable in part to fuel supply being based on air ambulance services and not on
extended SAR operations in remote areas.
4.16 The current New Zealand SAR system does not guarantee that dedicated, appropriately
equipped and fixed-wing aircraft resources will be available for future SAR operations.
4.17 The current New Zealand SAR system does not adequately provide for dedicated,
appropriately equipped surface vessels to be available for future SAR operations
www.taic.org.nz/sites/default/files/inquiry/documents/MO-2022-201%20Final%20Report.pdf